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Cosmopolitanism, 
Freedom, and Indifference: 
A Levinasian View
Eduard Jordaan*
Despite cosmopolitanism’s concern for the world’s poor and its
concomitant heavy moral demands, cosmopolitans establish a
limit to the self’s responsibility for the global poor. This con-
trasts with Emmanuel Levinas’s view that the self has an infinite
responsibility for the other, a responsibility that derives from the
self’s questioning of the impact of his freedom on others. From
a Levinasian perspective, cosmopolitanism’s restriction of the
self’s responsibility for others creates a sphere of rightful indif-
ference to the needs of the other; lends legitimacy to a disregard
of the other; forestalls an ethical awakening to the other; con-
strains the achievement of a more just global order, given that,
from a Levinasian perspective, a better justice is built on the
self’s open-ended responsibility for the other; and points to a
tension at the heart of cosmopolitanism, considering the coex-
istence of elements that both frustrate and aspire to the achieve-
ment of global justice. It is concluded that the achievement of
cosmopolitanism’s goals would require the acceptance of an
open-ended responsibility for the other. KEYWORDS: Levinas, cos-
mopolitanism, responsibility, otherness, the global poor.
In an introduction to a collection of his papers, one of the leading
cosmopolitan theorists, Thomas Pogge, expresses his dismay at our
indifference to the world’s poor through two questions. He asks,
“How can severe poverty of half of humankind continue despite enor-
mous economic and technological progress and despite the enlight-
ened moral norms and values of our heavily dominant Western
civilization?” and “Why do we citizens of the affluent Western states
not find it morally troubling, at least, that a world heavily dominated
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by us and our values gives such very deficient and inferior starting po-
sitions and opportunities to so many people?”1 Pogge’s short answer
is because we do not find the eradication of global poverty “morally
compelling.”2 Such indifference to the needs of the global poor flouts
the central tenet of (moral) cosmopolitanism, which holds that “every
human being has a global stature as ultimate unit of moral concern,”3
which is usually interpreted as saying that responsibility and distribu-
tive justice do not end at national borders. Indeed, cosmopolitan writ-
ing in recent decades has been marked by a deep concern for the
plight of the world’s poor and by arguments that we have a greater re-
sponsibility for them than we generally recognize.
Despite moral cosmopolitanism’s imputed concern for the world’s
poor and the heavy demands this would presumably place on us, cosmo-
politans nevertheless establish or enable a limit to the self’s responsi-
bility for the global poor. Cosmopolitanism’s restriction of the self’s
responsibility for the poor contrasts with Emmanuel Levinas’s view
that the self has a bottomless and inescapable responsibility for the
other, a responsibility that stems from the self’s deep questioning of
the impact of its freedom on others. According to Levinas, moral
progress and the achievement of a greater justice are founded on the
self-questioning and infinite responsibility brought about by our catch-
ing sight of the “face” of the other. A Levinasian perspective assists us
in bringing to the fore a number of closely related implications of cos-
mopolitanism’s restriction of the self’s responsibility for others. First,
because cosmopolitans speak from a moral high ground, their per-
mitting of a restriction of the self’s responsibility for the other lends le-
gitimacy to such a turn away from the other and the creation of a
sphere of rightful indifference to the demands of the other. Second, if
even a moral outlook as demanding as cosmopolitanism allows indif-
ference to the global poor, then it should come as little surprise that
we are able to maintain a good conscience amid the preventable dying
of the world’s poor. Third, although cosmopolitanism has established
a reputation for the seemingly heavy moral demands it would place
on us, it should be recognized that cosmopolitanism is perhaps not
quite as demanding as we are led to believe, particularly if one con-
siders the variety of ways to establish some freedom from responsibil-
ity for the other on offer in cosmopolitan theory. Fourth, for Levinas,
responsibility for the other stems from the self’s awakening to the in-
justice and “violence” that permanently attend its freedom. However,
the cosmopolitan restriction of responsibility for the other amounts to
the maintaining of a domain in which the self may regard itself as
rightfully and unproblematically free, thus forestalling a self-question-
ing, ethical awakening. Fifth, as a better justice is built upon the self’s
open-ended concern for the other, the cosmopolitan establishment of
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some sphere of indifference to the other constrains the achievement
of the more just and caring global order to which cosmopolitans as-
pire. Finally, the presence of cosmopolitanism’s strong aspiration to a
more just world order alongside elements that frustrate this ambition
suggest a tension at the heart of this body of thought.
My disagreement is not with cosmopolitanism’s desire for a more
just world order. My criticism is also not aimed at cosmopolitan thought
insofar as it operates at the national or global level of analysis. In-
stead, my concern is with how cosmopolitans extend and limit re-
sponsibility at the interpersonal level and the implications thereof. By
following Levinas’s view that the aspiration to a better justice stems
from the self’s open-ended responsibility for the other, it becomes pos-
sible to see that cosmopolitanism’s restriction of this interpersonal re-
sponsibility pulls against the achievement of a more caring and just
global order. While cosmopolitanism’s global-level ambitions—global
distributive justice, the democratization of international institutions,
etc.—are worthy of support, its widespread restriction of responsibility
for the other should be given up. Instead, a politics constantly in-
formed by “ethics,” an attitude of constant self-questioning, and, con-
comitantly, open-ended responsibility for the other person is more
appropriate for an aspiration toward a just global order.
What is attractive about Levinas’s work is that it, by implication,
condemns our indifference to the global poor without equivocation
and that it gives us the tools to expose previously unsuspected areas
that permit such indifference, for example, within cosmopolitanism.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to defend Levinas
against his critics4—hopefully the presentation of his ideas below will
be persuasive enough—it is necessary to address one concern. Using
Levinas’s notion of infinite responsibility to criticize cosmopolitanism
for its more limited concern for the other might strike some as a
rather simpleminded ploy, so it should be noted that a Levinasian ethics
is not as farfetched as it is sometimes made out to be, for two reasons.
First, while Levinas understands an ethical life as a permanent open-
ness toward and a preoccupation with the plight of the other, Levinas
nevertheless recognizes that the self is constantly pulled back toward a
concern for itself. After all, “one can exchange everything between be-
ings except existing”; I am “riveted” to myself.5 Secondly, and more
germane to this article, Levinas allows the self to provisionally limit its
responsibility for the other, which Levinas enables by introducing a
“third” next to the other. The third represents the multitude who also
look “at me in the eyes of the other.”6 As the third is also an other for
whom the self is infinitely responsible, it is necessary for the self to
limit its responsibility toward one other so as to respond to numerous
others (the “third”). The presence of the third marks the beginning
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of equality as the self divides its responsibility, and of politics as com-
petition emerges over how equality should be interpreted and re-
sponsibility should be apportioned. Importantly, the equal treatment
that ensues in this political society also entails a more equal distribu-
tion of responsibility, thus creating room for the self to be concerned
with his own plight. Levinas acknowledges that equality in its various
guises is a worthy goal, but where he parts company with cosmopoli-
tan theorists is through his view that the ethical relation between self
and other—a relation of open-ended responsibility—is irreducible.
In other words, despite the presence of the third and the equality (in
its various guises) between myself and others this suggests, every per-
son is at the same time a singular being whose face commands me to
an asymmetrical and limitless responsibility for him; “I can substitute
myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me.”7 So,
while Levinas allows the self to be drawn away from its responsibility
for the other in mass society, the permanent presence of the other as
other means that my self-regarding freedom is always tentative, my
good conscience always compromised, and my responsibility always
unfinished. In cosmopolitanism, by contrast, my freedom is asserted
more strongly, the line between responsibility and indifference is
drawn more firmly, and the burden of responsibility is cast off more
freely.
This article consists of four further sections. The first demon-
strates some of the ways in which a number of prominent cosmopoli-
tan thinkers limit the self’s responsibility for the other. The second
presents a Levinasian critique of the autonomous self created by cos-
mopolitanism’s restriction of responsibility for the other and traces
how this putting in question of the free self moves toward a life of in-
finite responsibility for the other. The third section considers how a
relation of infinite responsibility for the other is affected by the pres-
ence of numerous others for whom the self can clearly not simultane-
ously be infinitely responsible. In the fourth section, it is argued that
cosmopolitanism needs to be constantly informed by the ethical rela-
tion with the other, while some practical examples of what such an eth-
ical politics entail will also be considered.
Cosmopolitanism’s Restriction of Responsibility
While political philosophers have always disagreed over the degree to
which freedom should be limited—over the substance of equality and
over the extent of one’s responsibility for others—there has been lit-
tle dispute that there ought to be a limit to my responsibility for oth-
ers and what they may legitimately demand of me. The restriction of
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these demands and responsibilities, or letting them spill over into the
domain of supererogation, points to an arena where the subject may
enjoy its freedom with a clear conscience, justified in living beyond
the reproach and demands of the other. Cosmopolitans conform to
this pattern in political philosophy as they enable or establish a limit
to the self’s responsibility for others, despite the generosity, moral con-
cern, and exhortations that we take up considerable and increased re-
sponsibility toward the world’s poor, that pervade their writing.
Through a discussion of the work of a number of prominent cos-
mopolitan authors, this section indicates a variety of ways in which
cosmopolitans limit the self’s responsibility for others and to establish
the pervasiveness of this trend in cosmopolitanism.
Thomas Pogge’s writing is marked by a deep concern for the global
poor, a relentless exposure of factors that contribute to and sustain
global poverty, and deep dismay at our indifference to global injustice.
Pogge’s distinction between interactional and institutional cosmopoli-
tanism, and his preference for the latter, is a central and distinctive
feature of his approach. For interactional cosmopolitans, the respon-
sibility for securing the human rights of others is direct, interpersonal,
and lies with persons or groups of persons. Institutional cosmopoli-
tans, by contrast, hold that such responsibility is indirect, impersonal,
and should most appropriately be assigned to institutions, that is, the
social framework that regulates and guides human interaction.8 Al-
though Pogge regards institutional and interactional cosmopoli-
tanism as potentially supplementary, he does not resolve this matter;
instead he privileges the institutional view, since, for him, it “leads to
a much stronger and more plausible overall morality.”9 According to
Pogge, institutional cosmopolitanism holds the benefit of not having
to demand any “notoriously controversial” positive duties toward the
world’s starving poor, but merely requires that we do not participate
in institutions that yield such starvation “without making reasonable
efforts to aid its victims and promote institutional reform.”10 As vari-
ous national and global institutions combine to yield economic con-
sequences of genocidal magnitude, it is incumbent on those of us
who live under those governments that hold most sway in maintaining
the global economic order to influence our governments to shape a
global economic order that is less harmful to the poor.11 However, by
pushing responsibility for others onto institutions, Pogge creates con-
siderable space in which to be free from responsibility for others. Fur-
thermore, by demanding only “reasonable efforts,” defined as “as
much of an effort, aimed at protecting the victims of injustice or at in-
stitutional reform, as would suffice to eradicate the harms, if others
followed suit,” Pogge explicitly limits the self’s responsibility for the
other.12
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Pogge classifies Henry Shue and David Luban as interactional
cosmopolitans.13 Saying nothing of institutions, Luban defines human
rights as “the demands of all of humanity on all of humanity.”14 Sim-
ilarly, for Shue, “to have a right is to be in a position to make demands
of others.”15 People enjoy human rights irrespective of the institu-
tions under which they find themselves. According to Shue, we have
a duty to create institutions where they do not exist in order to protect
the rights of others.16 The stringency of Luban’s cosmopolitanism
emerges in his claim that a human right is a right “whose beneficiaries
are all humans and whose obligors are all humans in a position to effect the
right.”17 The italicization indicates where the potential for evading
one’s responsibility appears in Luban’s position. By leaving the effect-
ing of the rights of others up to those in a position to do so, Luban
provides the subject with an escape from responsibility for others, for,
is it not usually possible to justifiably claim that one is not in a position
to effect the human rights of others? Is it not always possible to resort
to some spurious argument to defend one’s failure to promote and
protect the rights of others, even though it is conceivable that, with
the exception of a few extreme cases, one is also always able to pro-
mote another person’s human rights? Shue makes possible a similar
evasion of responsibility for the human rights of others by describing
a right as “a justified demand that some other people make some
arrangements so that one will still be able to enjoy the substance of
the right even if . . . it is not within one’s power to arrange on one’s
own to enjoy the substance of the right.”18 Elsewhere Shue states “that
the relevant other people have a duty to create, if they do not exist, or,
if they do, to preserve effective institutions for the enjoyment of what
people have rights to enjoy.”19 By not indicating who the relevant per-
sons are, Shue enables the claim that one is not the relevant person
to secure the rights of others and therefore not responsible. The
problem rests not so much with the size of the sphere outside of re-
sponsibility that is permitted by Luban and Shue’s vagueness, but that
such a sphere is indeed made possible.
Charles Beitz’s influential book, Political Theory and International
Relations, was written in the heady days that followed the publication
of Rawls’s masterpiece, A Theory of Justice.20 Rawls’s influence is visible
in Beitz’s approach as well as in his emphasis on distributive justice.
But to see where Beitz parts ways with Rawls, briefly recall the basics
of Rawls’s argument in A Theory of Justice. Rawls uses a thought experi-
ment in which members of a hypothetical autarkic community are re-
quired to choose fundamental principles of justice from behind a “veil
of ignorance”—that is, without knowing vital elements of their identity,
such as their economic situation, their talents, or their conceptions of
88 Cosmopolitanism, Freedom, and Indifference
alt-jordaan-fin.qxd  6/10/09  4:38 PM  Page 88
the good.21 Rawls argues that deliberation behind a veil of ignorance
would yield two principles of justice. The first principle holds that
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total sys-
tem of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all”
and enjoys priority over the second principle (the “difference princi-
ple”) whereby socioeconomic inequalities should be arranged to max-
imize the benefit to the worst-off.22 Beitz’s major disagreement with
Rawls concerns the appropriate scope of the difference principle,
which Rawls confines to a national community. Beitz, by contrast, ar-
gues that some measure of global distributive justice ought to apply to
rectify the uneven and undeserved distribution of natural resources
among states. Beitz’s global “resource distribution principle” would
function like a limited difference principle, ensuring a distribution of
natural resources sufficient for resource-poor societies to support just
social institutions and human rights.23 Beitz also presents a second ar-
gument for globalizing the scope of distributive justice, subsuming is-
sues of natural resource distribution under its broader remit. Simply
stated, global economic interdependence yields benefits and burdens
that would not have come about if all states were autarkic, therefore
principles of distributive justice ought to apply at a global level to
specify a fair distribution of these benefits and burdens of social co-
operation.24
What is cause for concern is that Beitz, in his desire for Political
Theory and International Relations “to be continuous with Rawls’s own
enterprise,” has included various other aspects of Rawls’s approach
that provide the self with distance from its responsibility for the poor,
even though Beitz’s reworking of the difference principle will yield
greater duties to the poor.25 While the priority of the liberty principle
over the difference principle is the most important way in which the
freedom of the self is given precedence over responsibilities to the
other, the self’s responsibility for the other is also limited in other
ways.26 For example, Rawls allows us to refuse “supererogatory actions”;
a category of actions that would hold very good consequences for the
other but would require too great a risk or sacrifice from the sub-
ject.27 Further, the duty of mutual aid, a type of natural duty, would
be chosen in the original position. However, the reason for doing so
is a self-interested one: “The primary value of the principle is not
measured by the help we actually receive but rather by the sense of
confidence and trust in other men’s good intentions and the knowl-
edge that they are there if we need them.”28 Finally, the principle of
reciprocity, which obtains when the distribution of benefits and bur-
dens is mutually acceptable, is fundamental to Rawls and Beitz’s con-
ceptions of justice. On this view, justice entails quid pro quo, whereas,
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for Levinas, justice derives from the asymmetrical responsibility of the
self for the other, a relation in which is one is responsible irrespective
of whether the other reciprocates. 
Against a view of justice as mutual advantage, an arrangement in
which people cooperate because the benefits of social cooperation
exceed those of constant conflict and in which the outcomes of jus-
tice reflect the relations of power between social agents, Brian Barry
advances a view of justice as impartiality.29 Barry favors such an ap-
proach to justice partly because an understanding of justice as the dis-
tribution of the spoils of social cooperation undercuts the claims for
justice from those who are so economically marginal that they cannot
be seen as contributing to whatever there is to distribute.30 Behind
Barry’s preference for understanding justice as impartiality lies the
claim that “there has to be some reason for behaving justly that is not
reducible to even a sophisticated and indirect pursuit of self-interest,”
as well as the desire to justify ourselves to others.31 If we take the de-
fensibility of our actions seriously and forego appealing to force to
justify our actions, then impartially just principles would be those that
others in a similar position “could not reasonably reject.”32 A partic-
ular headache for Barry is specifying how partial we are permitted to
be toward those with whom we have special affective and political re-
lationships (that is, permitted by reasonable persons affected by our
partiality), because at some point our commitments to those close to
us clash with the interests of outsiders. Barry’s response to this problem
is to use a Scanlonian method to have people decide “just the right
amount” of partiality after having considered everyone’s perspective
equally. Regardless of the vagueness of stipulating just the right
amount of partiality and the difficulties of such a decisionmaking
process, what Barry arrives at, or at least aspires to, is a limit to what
outsiders may legitimately expect of the self. After fulfilling one’s
obligations to outsiders as stipulated by an impartial agreement, one
is granted a domain within which one may feel justified in not con-
cerning itself with the plight of outsiders. Elsewhere, Barry is more
explicit about the limits to our responsibility: He acknowledges that
“there is no firm criterion for the amount of sacrifice required to re-
lieve distress,” but maintains that “there are limits to what people can
be required to sacrifice.”33
In The Moral Demands of Affluence, Garrett Cullity defends the
placing of moderate demands on those of us living in “a bubble of
privilege, floating on a deep pool of human misery.”34 Although Cul-
lity’s moderate demands are significant enough to make most of us
uncomfortable, he leaves us enough room to pursue personal pro-
jects and devote time to our special relationships, and further deems
it acceptable to not spend “a lot of time worrying about whether this
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is right.”35 While Cullity’s position is in keeping with cosmopolitan-
ism’s fencing off of an area of indifference to the other, it nevertheless
remains instructive to consider how Cullity goes about it, particularly
because he embraces two elements, a duty of beneficence and the
lifesaving analogy, which at first glance would seem to lead to a more
demanding position than he defends. According to Cullity, it appears
as though the lifesaving analogy and a duty of beneficence lead to the
“Extreme Demand,” whereby
I am morally required to keep contributing my time and money to
aid agencies (or to some other comparably important cause), until
either (a) there are no longer any lives to be saved (or comparable
important goals achieved) by those agencies, or (b) contributing my
share of the cost of our collectively saving one further life (or doing
something comparably important) would itself be a large enough
sacrifice to excuse my refusing to contribute.36
However, the Extreme Demand is so demanding that is doubtful
whether anyone has actually managed to meet it, and therefore the
more appropriate conclusion to draw “is not that it is wrong not to
meet the Extreme Demand; but rather, that it is wrong not to get as
close to meeting the Extreme Demand as you productively can.”37 Al-
though the Extreme Demand, even in such qualified form, allows so
little room for nonaltruistic pursuits that we are unlikely to think it
true, it is with an eye on the nonaltruistic pursuits of the needy that
the Extreme Demand comes unstuck.38 The Extreme Demand holds
that “it is wrong to lead a non-altruistically-focused life.”39 However,
part of the reason why we should assist the poor is not only to allow
them to live longer, but also to live more fulfilling lives, which will
most likely include some nonaltruistic pursuits, which, in the terms of
the Extreme Demand, means that we are helping the poor to get what
is wrong to have. As it is clearly not wrong to facilitate the nonaltruis-
tic concerns of other people, such as reuniting a family separated by
civil war or giving a poor child a scholarship to study art, the Extreme
Demand should be rejected. The legitimacy of the poor leading non-
altruistically focused lives opens the door for the nonpoor to do the
same.40 While there is a vast array of nonaltruistically focused goals I
am required to help others attain, others are similarly required to
help me attain these goals. Moreover, “if others are required to help
me get something, it cannot be wrong for me to get it for myself.”41
This means that although it would be “morally wrong” to not make
monetary sacrifices to help the poor if these sacrifices would have lit-
tle impact on my pursuit of life-enhancing goods, I am allowed con-
siderable freedom from responsibility for others.42
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Cullity’s book is intended as a refutation of the more demanding
versions of cosmopolitanism, of which Peter Singer’s utilitarian posi-
tion is the prime example and indeed a lurking presence behind
much of Cullity’s book. Despite its high demands, even Singer’s utili-
tarian cosmopolitanism preserves for the subject some corner of le-
gitimate indifference to the needs of the other. In his famous article,
“Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Singer argues that “if it is in our
power to prevent something bad from happening [e.g., famine],
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral impor-
tance, we ought, morally, to do it.”43 Everyone is obliged to adhere to
this principle, irrespective of what others do.44 So, when confronted
with a choice between buying another pair of trousers and donating
the money to famine relief, we are to give the money to famine relief,
without being able to claim the status of charity, generosity, or
supererogation for our action. For Singer, it would clearly be “wrong”
not to give the money to the famine relief.45 The limit of our obliga-
tions toward others is reached at the “level of marginal utility—that is,
the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to
myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift,” presuming
that this level can indeed be calculated.46 Despite the selflessness and
moral demandingness of Singer’s position, the marginal utility thresh-
old nonetheless marks a point where the subject is relieved of its re-
sponsibility for others and permitted a sphere of autonomy.
I have thus far paid very little attention to the various types of cos-
mopolitanism, in part because the lines that separate the different cos-
mopolitan approaches are not always that clear; is Pogge, for example,
best described as a liberal, contractarian, institutional, or human rights
cosmopolitan?47 Despite these misgivings, it is nevertheless possible to
identify a strain of cosmopolitanism in which the use of dialogue to de-
cide just arrangements is emphasized. The influence of discourse
ethics and the debate over whether to understand justice in terms of re-
distribution or recognition is particularly visible in the writing of so-
called “dialogic cosmopolitans,” represented here by Andrew Linklater
and Richard Shapcott. Dialogic cosmopolitans steer the debate away
from liberal and utilitarian cosmopolitanism’s preoccupation with dis-
tributive justice and rights toward a stronger focus on respect for dif-
ference. In contrast to liberal and utilitarian cosmopolitanism’s
stripping of persons of their individuating features, isolating them from
groups with which they identify, and treating them as essentially similar,
all for the sake of deriving universal principles from an impartial per-
spective, dialogical cosmopolitans demonstrate greater sensitivity to the
social, political, and moral webs in which we are situated and to which
our identities are deeply linked.48 Insofar as universal principles are
necessary, dialogic cosmopolitans hold that these should be derived
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from agreements reached through open and unconstrained dialogue
in which difference is not regarded as an obstacle to agreement. Be
that as it may, as it stands, dialogic cosmopolitanism also does not
bridge those elements in liberal and utilitarian cosmopolitanism that
perpetuate our indifference to the global poor. However, read through
a Levinasian lens, dialogic cosmopolitanism’s emphasis on difference
harbors the potential to elicit greater concern for the global poor
other, a matter to which we will return in the concluding section.
Although Linklater and Shapcott’s dialogical cosmopolitanism
professes a constant openness to otherness through dialogue, this
openness does not extend to a constant and unlimited responsibility
for others. In Shapcott’s case, the refusal of a permanent and asym-
metrical responsibility for the other is made explicit through his in-
sistence on equality and reciprocity between self and other. Against
David Campbell’s Levinas-inspired understanding of intersubjectivity
in which the other is placed at a height, Shapcott argues,
there remains a need for caution in relation to Levinas’s ethics for
the following reason. There is a danger that placing the other at a
height is not a relationship of equality as such. In this scenario the
other’s needs come before those of the self and the other is some-
how seen to be more important or to have a superior demand. The
question that can only be raised here is what is there in this en-
counter for the needs of the “self” and for the other’s responsibility
for the self. For ethics of radical interdependence to realise a fully
equal relationship it would seem that this responsibility must neces-
sarily be reciprocal. Campbell does not employ Levinas’s work in
order to pursue a theory of community or justice and, as such, equal-
ity is not the foundational value of his ethics. However, as this [Shap-
cott’s] enquiry is concerned with the idea of formulating an account
of community that does justice to difference, the notion of equality
is essential.49
In The Transformation of Political Community, Andrew Linklater declares
his goal as the “triple transformation of political community to secure
greater respect for cultural differences, stronger commitments to the
reduction of material inequalities and significant advances in univer-
sality,”50 even though he pays minimal attention to the distributive as-
pects of this transformation and instead focuses on the “prospects for
achieving progress towards higher levels of universality and difference
in the modern world.”51 More specifically, most of Linklater’s efforts
are directed at justifying and describing the potential for political com-
munity, which is still predominantly national in scope, to become a con-
duit, rather than be an obstacle, toward a universal moral community
in which the normative validity of particular acts are decided by all
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those affected through a process of open and unrestricted dialogue.52
But, even though I have not come across an explicit suspension of the
self’s responsibility for the other in Linklater’s writing, by confining
his proposed permanent moral watchfulness to checking for obsta-
cles to open discourse in a dialogical community,53 rather than un-
derstanding this permanent vigilance in a wider sense as a
responsibility for others beyond the principles and agreements
reached in a dialogical community, Linklater creates some space away
from responsibility for the other. In other words, in Linklater’s frame-
work, once the views of those who stand to be affected by our actions
have been listened to in an open dialogical situation, one need not
pay attention to the further needs of the other. Furthermore, al-
though Linklater does not give much content to the normative prin-
ciples that are to govern our (transnational) interaction, the
achievement of his aspiration toward universal consensus neverthe-
less corresponds to the “moment of justice” in Levinas, that is, the
equal curtailment and distribution of responsibility for numerous
others in the presence of the third, which opens up for the subject
some freedom to be for itself.
This section has considered a variety of ways in which prominent
cosmopolitan theorists limit or enable a limit of the self’s responsi-
bility for the other. These included the shifting of responsibility onto
institutions; requiring only that rather undefined “reasonable efforts”
be made or that rather unspecified persons take responsibility; citing
my special relationships with specific persons to justify a restriction of
responsibility for persons outside this circle; defending the subject’s
right to pursue personal projects and other life-enhancing goods; and
simply calculating or asserting a point where responsibility for the
other stops. With an eye on the next section, it might be helpful to re-
call MacCullum’s view that all conceptions of freedom have a triadic
form: They make reference to an agent, what the agent is free from,
and what the agent is free to do or to become, or, “X is (is not) free
from Y to do (not do, become, not become) Z.”54 The focus of this sec-
tion was on the Y aspect of freedom in cosmopolitan writing (the sub-
ject’s freedom from responsibility for the other), while the next section
will consider the Z aspect of the self’s freedom. It is through a prob-
lematization of the performative aspect of the subject’s freedom that its
claim to a legitimate curtailment of responsibility for the other is un-
dermined.
Levinas’s Critique of the Autonomous Subject
Despite recognizing a considerable degree of responsibility toward oth-
ers, cosmopolitans nevertheless create a sphere in which the subject is
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relieved of its responsibility for others and where it is seemingly justi-
fied in enjoying the freedom created by this restriction of responsi-
bility. Levinas sees the dominant tradition in political philosophy as
having achieved consensus that social life is made possible by a limi-
tation of freedom and by the acceptance of a certain degree of re-
sponsibility for others.55 However, the prevailing tradition is one in
which the subject’s right to freedom, not to mention its right to be, is
not questioned or renounced.56 Moreover, in this tradition, the free-
dom of the subject remains and is maintained as a principal goal and
concern, while the possibility that the life and freedom of the other
are more important than that of the subject is not even entertained.
Viewed as central and viewing itself as central, the subject regards the
other in instrumental terms, instrumental to its security, interests, and
freedom. With the egological subject at the center of all questioning
and undertaking, the other is dominated, objectified, utilized, reduced
and chained to a concept, rendered intelligible, and continuously dis-
ciplined to conform to the concept by which he is known. What over-
flows the bounds of the concept of the other is discarded, suppressed,
or ignored. This “scandal of alterity,” the failure to contain the other
in a concept, “presupposes the tranquil identity of the same, a free-
dom sure of itself which is exercised without scruples, and to whom
the foreigner brings only constraint and limitation.”57
Insofar as I, the subject, have dominated the other through my
egoistic pursuits, I have not noticed his “face.” In Levinas, the face of
the other suggests, first, the irreducible uniqueness of the other per-
son, ultimately resistant to comprehension, representation, categori-
sation and containment in a conceptual framework—“the face breaks
the system”;58 second, an immediacy between the other and myself, a
relationship “without the mediation of any principle or ideality”;59
third, the other’s vulnerability and defenselessness—a “resistance of
what has no resistance”;60 and fourth, an ethical command against in-
difference to the other, against letting “the other die alone; that is to
say, to be answerable for the life of the other, or else risk becoming
the accomplice of that death.”61 The other as face does not confront
me with a freedom similar to and as arbitrary as my own, but opposes
me with a resistance that is ethical—the face awakens me to my dom-
ination of the other and arrests my egoism.62 “To approach the other
is to put into question my freedom, my spontaneity as a living being,
my emprise over the things, this freedom of a ‘moving force,’ this im-
petuosity of the current to which everything is permitted.”63 More rad-
ically still, to be confronted by the nakedness of the other’s face is a
“crisis of being . . . because I begin to ask myself if my being is justified,
if the Da of my Dasein is not already the usurpation of somebody
else’s place.”64 It is a crisis of being because the subject recognizes
that, through the mere act of existence, it is implicated in the death
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of the other.65 If so implicated, how could the self ever hope to justify
its right to be?66
The subject, the usurper of the place of the other, is rehabilitated
by assuming an asymmetrical and infinite responsibility for the other.67
For Levinas, the affirmation of the subject occurs via the other and lies
in the subject’s ability to negate itself, to give, to be good, “emptying
itself of its being” in responsibility and concern for the other.68 Re-
sponsibility for the other is asymmetrical because “at the outset I hardly
care what the other is with respect to me, that is his own business; for
me, he is above all the one I am responsible for.”69 Responsibility for
the other is limitless in two senses: first, responsibility entails a con-
stant resistance to the centripetal concern with one’s own usurping
and consuming existence;70 and second, assuming responsibility for
the other opens up into an ever-increasing responsibility as I find my-
self implicated in situations and problems that do not stem from
something I have done. Levinas writes that as I increasingly “divest
myself, under the traumatic effect of persecution, of my freedom as a
constituted, wilful, imperialist subject, the more I discover myself to
be responsible; the more just I am, the more guilty I am.”71 Strange
as it may seem, persecution by the other is the foundation of solidarity
with the other.72 Responsibility and concern for the other, and there-
fore for the world that surrounds him, drive our aspiration for a more
just and humane order.73
The ethical relation with the other is a permanent dimension of
intersubjectivity; responsibility comes from a “time immemorial,” a
“pluperfect past,” because I was born into a world in which the other
was already present. The subject finds itself responsible in situations
that were not of its choosing or the result of its actions, accused for
failing to meet its responsibility, persecuted by the other. There is no
escape. Since the self is always in the presence of the other, the self is
the one who, “before all decision, is elected to bear all the responsi-
bility for the World . . . a reversal of being ‘persevering in his being’—
which begins in [him].”74 In contrast to the activity of the autonomous
subject, to be responsible for the other is “to catch sight of an extreme
passivity,” a subjectivity infused with what the self has no control
over.75 The permanence of the ethical relation between the subject
and the other means that the freedom of the subject is compromised
from the outset: The ethical relation is a “movement [in which] my
freedom does not have the last word.”76
Hesitant Freedom, Permanent Responsibility
Levinas’s critique of the imperialist subject and his insistence upon an
infinite responsibility for the other that precedes the subject’s freedom
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might create the impression that he has foreclosed the possibility of
speaking about freedom in its more usual senses (e.g., in terms of in-
dependence or self-centered pursuits) and that he as denied the pur-
suit of freedom as a legitimate goal for the self. In this regard, it is
important to note that the relation of infinite responsibility for the
other refers to the interpersonal relation between self and other. By
introducing the notion of the “third,” Levinas is able to address mat-
ters related to the presence of more than one other and to mass so-
ciety, and to explain how space for the self to be free opens up. In the
presence of the third, who has always been present, I am confronted
by another other who is also a face and thus also commands my infi-
nite responsibility.77 The third is another other to me, but he is also
an other to the other. I am not to commit myself to one other at the
expense of all others. In order to be just, I have to limit my responsi-
bility to the specific other and divide it among numerous others78—
“in the very name of the absolute obligation towards one’s fellow
man, a certain abandonment of the absolute allegiance he calls forth
is necessary.”79
The limitation of responsibility in the presence of the third indi-
cates the beginning of equality between others, as well as the begin-
ning of politics as conflict arises over the substance of equality.
Moreover, the limitation of the self’s responsibility for the other in
the presence of the third opens up for the self a provisional freedom
to be for itself.80 In the presence of the third, that is, in a society of
equal citizens, concern with my lot also acquires legitimacy. Yet we
seem to have run into a contradiction. On the one hand Levinas says
that I am infinitely responsible for the other (the interpersonal ethi-
cal relation), while on the other hand he allows for a limit to my re-
sponsibility in the presence of the third (the impersonal political
relation).81 This tension cannot be resolved as the other person is
both the other and the third to me; “the face is both the neighbour
and the face of faces, visage and visibility.”82 Every person I come
across is both a general and equal other with whom I stand in a po-
litical relation, as well as a specific other who summons me to re-
sponsibility in the ethical relation.83 When faced by the other, I can
respond politically, seeing the other as my equal, restricting my re-
sponsibility to him, insisting on reciprocity and equality between us,
and asserting my rights against his; or, I can respond ethically, by being
concerned and assuming responsibility for him beyond what is re-
quired by our political equality and reciprocity. Do I relate to the other
ethically or politically? I am constantly faced with this choice. Both a
political and an ethical response to the other enjoy legitimacy, al-
though, from a Levinasian perspective, a political response to the other
does not enjoy it fully, as the self’s responsibility for the other is always
unfinished. Admittedly, we generally do not behave as though we are
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infinitely responsible for others and the prevailing mode our interac-
tion with others in mass society cannot but be political. Nevertheless,
Levinas’s aim should be understood as trying to undermine the view
of the subject that underlies and sees as legitimate a political response
to the other—a view that holds the subject as central, sovereign, inde-
pendent, and origin of everything—by infusing subjectivity with an
inescapable and unlimited responsibility that renders autonomous
subjectivity permanently compromised, an aim that Levinas expresses as
“try[ing] to articulate the break-up of a fate that reigns in essence.”84
A further implication of the presence of the third and the neces-
sary limitation of our responsibility for the specific other is that we
have to ask about and establish an arrangement of justice that will
best realize our responsibility for a plurality of persons, to which cos-
mopolitans have a characteristic set of answers, as do authors of a
more communitarian bent. More specifically, it becomes necessary,
first, to categorize, describe, compare, and judge people and their
needs—to “compare the incomparable”85—for example, as the “global
poor” or as “we”; second, to seek objective and general principles of
justice and standards of judgment; and third, to think about and es-
tablish the institutional arrangements through which our responsi-
bility for others can best be achieved. The generality, objectivity,
systemization, objectification, comparison, and bureaucratic decision-
making required by justice amount to the suppression and discarding
of the otherness of the other, an effacement as it were. Moreover, jus-
tice and its institutions always fall short of meeting our infinite re-
sponsibility for the other.
The necessary suppression of the other’s otherness in the quest
for general institutional and theoretical designs is tolerable as long as
this otherness is not lost sight of, for it is the otherness of the other,
his face, that reminds us of our unfinished responsibility for him and
of the incompleteness of justice. The face provokes and inspires prog-
ress toward a more humane and just order. That said, Levinas warns
that in the realm of the political there is the constant danger that the
ethical relation with the other be lost from view, even in the well-in-
tentioned and necessary aspiration toward rational, impersonal, and
objective political institutions. When politics and the maintenance of
order begin to justify themselves, rather than drawing their justifi-
cation from ethics, we run the risk of “inhumanity,” an abandoning of
“the world to useless suffering.”86 So for the sake of the other, we
should guard against the alienation inherent to the political order.
For Levinas, justice
is not a natural and anonymous legality governing the human masses,
from which is derived a technique of social equilibrium, placing in
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harmony the antagonistic and blind forces through transitory cru-
elties and violence, a State delivered over to its own necessities that
it is impossible to justify.87
Rather, justice arises at least in part out of the subject’s ethical re-
sponsibility toward more than one other.88 Beneath the equality of
persons in the political relation lies the asymmetry between the self
and the other of the ethical relationship,89 indeed “responsibility for
the neighbour is precisely what goes beyond the legal and obliges be-
yond contracts.”90 It is goodness, as responsibility for the other, “dis-
rupting the general economy of the real and standing in sharp contrast
with the perseverance of entities persisting in their being” that im-
proves justice, even though, in the objective order of justice, the good-
ness of responsibility tends to be regarded and discarded as an
aberration in the system of justice—gratuitous, supererogatory.91 Still,
justice and its institutions should, at a minimum, “always be held in
check by the initial interpersonal relation.”92
This section has recognized the predominance and even the ten-
tative legitimacy of the political relation between self and other, a re-
lation of equality and each-person-for-himself. However, a sole focus
on the political relation is incomplete as it overlooks the irreducible
ethical relation between the self and the other, as identified by Lev-
inas. An acknowledgment of the ethical relation, a relation of infinite
responsibility for the other, permanently puts into question claims
that a political response to the other is legitimate. Even though cos-
mopolitans take up a considerable amount of responsibility for the
other, the cosmopolitan restriction of responsibility means that a po-
litical response to the other ultimately prevails. This is problematic
for it maintains an autonomous, atomistic self and thus undermines
the likelihood that the self will sober up and “fear for all the violence
and murder [its] existing, despite its intentional and conscious inno-
cence, can bring about.”93 Moreover, by opting for a political rather
than an ethical response to the other, cosmopolitans, who write with
considerable moral authority, both justify a restriction of responsibil-
ity and help the subject maintain its good conscience, despite the ob-
vious and continued need of the other. Ultimately, the restriction of
responsibility for the other pulls against the more just global order
cosmopolitans so desperately seek, because the desire for a better jus-
tice stems from my ethical relation with the other, the responsible self
seeks a better justice for the sake of the other. Although the face-to-
face relation is interrupted and put in danger by the presence of the
third and the resultant predominance of the political relation, our eth-
ical responsibility for the other needs to find expression through poli-
tics for there to be a more humane justice.
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Conclusion: 
Toward an Ethical Politics
While a more ethical polity has been defined in various ways by Lev-
inas’s commentators,94 very little has been said about how to imbue
the political realm with the ethical in practice.95 Recall that accord-
ing to Levinas we are reminded of our unfinished responsibility by
the face of the other, which combines the singularity of the other
person with an ethical command. It therefore seems that in order to
achieve a less indifferent world one of the tasks before us is to con-
front the world with the face of the other, to awaken people to the
ethical command that issues from the other. In Levinas’s more dra-
matic language, what is required is a “denuding of the skin exposed
to wounds and outrage,” so as to yield “a suffering for the suffering
of the other.”96
However, we are immediately confronted with the problem that
by definition the face of the other cannot be represented.97 While
granting that all representations of the other suppress its otherness,
Levinas’s approach should at this point make room for taking the
qualitative differences of our representations of others into account,
and for representations that are more suggestive of the other’s face—
representations of the other in a greater complexity—to be used for
political purposes. While there are a few instances of Levinas assert-
ing the importance of representing the other in a greater fullness, I
have not come across evidence of him proposing this as a political
strategy.98 An emphasis on the complexity of the other as a political
strategy is in line with the work of the most significant exponent of
Levinas’s ideas in International Relations, David Campbell’s argu-
ment for a “refiguration of politics,” in the form of a “struggle for—
or on behalf of—alterity rather than a struggle to efface, erase, or
eradicate alterity.”99
By expressing the task of ethical politics in terms of presenting a
fuller and more nuanced representation of the other, a Levinasian ap-
proach finds common ground with political philosophers who argue
that by exposing people to narratives about the lives of others they are
more likely to feel concern for them (e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Richard
Rorty, and Edward Said), as well as with political philosophers who ad-
vocate a politics that aimed at the recognition of difference (e.g.,
William Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, Charles Taylor, and Iris Young).
More importantly, these two groups of political philosophers make nu-
merous practical suggestions on how to convey the other in a greater
complexity, suggestions that can be drawn upon to serve Levinasian
purposes, in whose writing we find no such politically practical sug-
gestions. One could, for example, draw on Nussbaum’s argument for
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an enlarged multicultural component in university education, a pro-
posal that would require a stronger focus on the arts, and on litera-
ture in particular, as well as the study of languages, cultures, and
religions that students find foreign.100 Rorty has also noted the ca-
pacity of the arts, and even television programs, to draw attention to
the lives of those we tend to overlook, particularly to the ways in which
we have been cruel to or neglectful of them.101 In addition, Rorty
notes that legal scholars, social scientists, and journalists are especially
well placed and equipped to act as “connoisseurs” and articulators of
diversity.102 Among those who emphasize justice to difference, Young
proposes “consciousness raising” (defining and drawing attention to
the oppression experienced by some groups), Mouffe advocates the
fracturing of homogenous identities and a political invigoration of
these freshly articulated differences, while Connolly seeks a constant
disturbance and contestation of “dogmatic” and seemingly normal
identities so as to increase “the number of positive identities.”103 These
strategies have typically been employed in local- or national-level po-
litical struggles. However, they can also be used to struggle on behalf
of those who live outside our national borders. Indeed, the achieve-
ment of the more just global order to which cosmopolitans aspire re-
quires that we are increasingly exposed to the nuances of the lives of
the world’s poor.
It has been argued that despite the moral concern for the world’s
poor that cosmopolitan thought exhibits and seeks to inspire in the
rest of us, the writings of some influential cosmopolitan authors con-
tain elements that strain against greater concern for the world’s poor,
and, more worryingly still, can be said to entrench and even engen-
der indifference toward the world’s poor. These unfortunate tenden-
cies in cosmopolitanism can be put down to losing sight of the ethical
relation with the other in the presence of numerous others. While
cosmopolitan theory remains necessary for trying to solve philosoph-
ical and practical problems about how to best and most appropriately
realize our responsibility for numerous others at the global level, cos-
mopolitanism needs to be informed and corrected by the ethical re-
lation between self and other, to, at a minimum, upset our continued
good conscience, but also to attain greater global justice. Levinasian
ethics does not purport to provide answers about the most appropri-
ate arrangement and content of our responsibility for people near and
far, but does insist that the poor stranger in a foreign country should
be considered and brought to the fore as a face, for it is the ethical in-
timacy between the other person and myself that inspires a better jus-
tice. By using political practices that bring to the fore the complexity
of the other or that emphasize her difference, thereby better suggest-
ing the face of the other, a world that cosmopolitans themselves seek,
Eduard Jordaan 101
alt-jordaan-fin.qxd  6/10/09  4:38 PM  Page 101
a world in which fewer of us would turn away from the millions who
are slipping toward preventable poverty-related deaths, is more likely
to come about.
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